






Shared Empathy and Self-Testimony in Psychiatric
Therapy and in Philosophical Practice – a Case Study
Abstract
I address the problem of how shared empathy and group therapy are a required condition 
for any successful work with patients in medical and clients in philosophical practice. More-
over, a theory of shared empathy must also account for the arguably more intricate issue 
of how group members might properly share their own mental domain with its distinctive 
phenomenology, and their distinctive attitudes toward one another, so that the necessary 
self-testimonies of clients do not rest on the previous pathological state. Furthermore, I aim 
to offer some steps towards solving this problem. I will do so by outlining what methodology 
lies behind the theory of shared empathy, and showing how, based on the results of a case 
study, it can be understood in such a way that it still accommodates all requirements for 




“… keep good civil order. Immediately afterwards
Oedipus speaks priestly: By what catharsis…”






might	seem	at	first	glance.	Self-testimony	is	a	way of approaching oneself;	the	
way	people	view	themselves,	finally,	the	way	clients	view	the	history	of	their	
1   
Jonathan	 Adler	 begins	 his	 first	 version	 of	
Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  article  
on	“Epistemological	problems	of	 testimony”	
with	 the	 following	 statement:	 “Testimony	
is	 the	 assertion	 of	 a	 declarative	 sentence	 by	
a	speaker	to	a	hearer	or	to	an	audience.”	Cf.	
Jonathan	 Adler,	 “Epistemological	 Problems	
of	 Testimony”,	 Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  
Philosophy (2008).	Available	 at:	 http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/tes-
timony-episprob/  (accessed  on  14  February  
2020).	 For	 a	 general	 historical	 background	 
 
on	 the	 problem	 of	 testimony	 cf.	 Cecil	 An-
thony	 John	Coady,	Testimony:  A  Philosoph-
ical  Study,	 Part	 II,	Oxford	University	 Press,	
Oxford	 1992;	 Rick	 Kennedy,	 A  History  of  
Reasonableness:  Testimony  and  Authority  in  
the  Art  of  Thinking,	University	of	Rochester	
Press,	 Rochester	 2004.	 Cf.	 also	 some	 influ-
ential	 works	 on	 testimony:	 Martin	 Kusch,	
Peter	 Lipton,	 “Testimony:	A	 Primer”,	 Stud-
ies  in  History  and  Philosophy  of  Science 
33	 (2002)	 2,	 pp.	 209–217,	 doi:	 https://doi.






through an intensely traumatic experience.
In	 this	 text,	 I	will	defend	 the	 thesis	 that	client	self-testimony	 is	unsolvable	
within	 the	 individual,	 i.e.	dyadic	philosophical	practical	 therapy.	Self-testi-




Lebensgeschichte)	 in	 the	 same	way,	 the	 empathy	 of	 other	 group	members	
–	which	 is	 (as	we	will	 see	 later)	based	on	collective	 intentionality	–	 is	 in-
dispensable	to	minimise	fallibility	and	incoherence	of	self-testimony.	Shared	








ticular	 client	 and	 their	 interaction	with	 other	 close	 people,	 which	 is	 often	
pre-reflective and pre-theoretical.2	This	means	that	the	client’s	immediate	life	
experience	 is	 not	 self-aware	 of	 the	 background	 in	which	 their	 life	 occurs.	
That	 is	why	 self-testimony	 is	 important	 –	 it	 has	 to	 bring	 the	 pre-reflexive	
and	non-thetic	to	the	surface	and	make	it	a	narrative	history	as	a	substantive	











to include group therapy in philosophical  practice.  Such therapy is  directly 
phenomenologically	 inspired,	based	on	 the	concept	of	 collective	 intention-
ality	and	 shared	emotions,	which	 traces	 its	 roots	back	 to	Max	Scheler	and	
Edith	 Stein’s	 early	 phenomenology.	After	 a	 short	 chapter	 on	 the	 essential	




2. Relation between Philosophical Practice and Medical Therapy








is	 inseparable	 from	 its	original	 therapeutic	orientation	and	 its	healing	mis-
sion.	Philosophy	as	 therapeutics	 is	not	 just	professionals’	activity	–	a	 trend	
currently	present	within	the	worldwide	academic	scene	–	or	the	conversation	
between  experts  in  the  so-called  Fachchinesisch  (i.e.  conversation  through  
technical	terminology),	it	spans	from	Socrates,	and	all	other	ancient	schools	
of	philosophy,	through	the	underestimated	medieval	scholasticism	(especially	
in the Summa Theologiae	of	Thomas	Aquinas),	and	to	philosophical	theories	
of	Spinoza,	Hegel5	 and	Nietzsche,	not	 to	mention	a	multitude	of	works	on	



















tonen,	 Jan	 Wolenski	 (eds.),	 Handbook  of  
Epistemology,	 Kluwer	Academic	 Publishers,	
Dordrecht	 2004,	 pp.	 109–130,	 doi:	 https://
doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_3;	 Peter	
Lipton,	 “The	 Epistemology	 of	 Testimony”,	
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Sci-
ence	 29	 (1998)	 1,	 pp.	 1–31,	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.1016/s0039-3681(97)00022-8.
2	   
Cf.	 Hans	 Bernhard	 Schmid,	 “Plural	
Self-Awareness”,	 Phenomenology  and  the  
Cognitive Sciences	13	(2014)	1,	pp.	7–24,	doi:	
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9317-z;	
Hans	 Bernhard	 Schmid,	 “The	 Feeling	 of	
Being	 a	 Group:	 Corporate	 Emotions	 and	
Collective	Consciousness”,	in:	Christian	von	
Scheve,	 Mikko	 Salmela	 (eds.),	 Collective 
Emotions: Perspectives from Psychology, 
Philosophy, and Sociology,	Oxford	Universi-
ty	Press,	Oxford	2014,	pp.	3–16.
3	   
Robert	D.	Walsh,	 “Philosophical	Counseling	
Practice”,	 Janus  Head	 8	 (2005)	 2,	 pp.	 497–
508,	p.	497.
4   
Cf.	 Clare	 Carlisle,	 Jonardon	 Ganeri	 (eds.),	
Philosophy  as  Therapeia,	 Royal	 Institute	 of	
Philosophy	Supplement	 66,	Cambridge	Uni-
versity	Press,	Cambridge	2010.
5	   
On	 Hegel’s	 therapeutic	 dimension	 of	 philo-
sophy,	cf.	Rastko	Jovanov,	“What	does	Sub-
lation	of	Moral	Consciousness	Mean	 for	 the	





6	   
Cf.	 Daniel	 Hutto,	Wittgenstein  and  the  End  
of Philosophy. Neither Theory nor Therapy,	
Palgrave	 Macmillan,	 London	 2003;	 James	
Peterman,	Philosophy  as  Therapy.  An  Inter-
pretation  and  Defense  of  Wittgenstein’s  Lat-
er  Philosophical  Project,	SUNY	Press,	New	
York	1992;	Christoffer	Gefwert,	Wittgenstein 
on Thought, Language and Philosophy. From 
Theory to Therapy,	Routledge,	London	2017.








and	getting	along	with	their	naturalness”.9 This is in line with the prevailing 
romantic	movement	of	 the	 time	and	 the	 so-called	“return	 to	nature”,	 since	
“the	art	of	genius”	(die Geniekunst)	failed	to	turn	out	to	be	a	saviour	from	the	





Attention	 was	 also	 paid	 to	 poetry	 and	 literature	 as	 adjunctive	 therapeutic	
means.	Also,	artistry	is	becoming	a	medical	and	pathological	finding,	 “aes-
thetic	productivity	becomes	a	therapeutic	surrogate”.12 Here we had a certain 
twist,	as	“philosophy	begins	turning	to	medicine,	and	medicine	begins	turn-
ing	to	philosophy”.13 This is especially evident in Schelling’s philosophy. He 
gives	a	central	position	to	the	“theory	of	disease”14	in	the	chapter	“Theorie	der	
Krankheit,	abgeleitet	aus	der	dynamischen	Stufenfolge	in	der	Natur”15 in his 
book First Attempt at a System of the Philosophy of Nature (Erster Entwurf 
eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799).	Three	years	later	in	his	Lectures 










3. Collective Intentionality and Shared Empathy









philosophical counselling. Such a counselling group should be based on the 
phenomenon	of	shared	empathy.	To	explain	the	basics	of	such	group	therapy	
that	philosophical	practitioners	should	adopt,	I	will	first	present	Edith	Stein’s	
empathy	analysis	from	1917.	In	her	dissertation	On the Problem of Empathy 
(Zum Problem der Einfühlung),18 Stein expounds shared empathy as the glue 
that  holds  a  group together.	 I	will	 then	outline	some	 influential	 current	 re-





mental acts in which we are directed towards something. This means that they 
characterise	 all	 experiences	 (both	 intellectual	 and	 emotional)	 in	which	we	
are	relative	to	an	object	of	experience.	Intentionality	is	thus	a	phenomenon	
that	makes	up	the	true	nature	of	mental	acts.	In	the	very	sense	of	the	word,	




and John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality	(1995)	the	philosophers’	
attention	was	exclusively	focused	on	the	analysis	of	individual intentionali-
8	   
Cf.	 Odo	Marquard,	 Schwierigkeiten  mit  der  
Geschichtsphilosophie.  Aufsätze,	 Suhrkamp,	
Frankfurt	am	Main	1997	(especially	the	chap-
ter	 “Über	 einige	Beziehungen	 zwischen	Äs-
thetik und Therapeutik in der Philosophie des 
neunzehnten	Jahrhunderts”,	pp.	85–107).




10	   
The  term  empathy  (die  Einfühlung)	 had	
previously	 been	 used	 only	 in	 theories	 of	
aesthetics.	 Cf.	 Joanna	 Ganczarek,	 Thomas	
Hünefeldt,	Marta	Olivetti	Belardinelli,	“From	
‘Einfühlung’	 to	empathy:	 exploring	 the	 rela-




of	 projecting	 oneself	 into	 another	 body	 or	
environment,	 i.e.	 (…)	 terms	 to	an	 imaginary	
bodily	 ‘displacement’	 (‘Versetzung’)	 of	 one-
self	into	another	body	or	environment,	which	
is	 aimed	at	understanding	how	 it	 feels	 to	be	
in  that  other  body  or  environment.  In  other  
words,	 it	 refers	 to	 some	 kind	 of	 imaginary	
bodily	 perspective	 taking,	 which	 is	 aimed	
at  understanding what it  would be like to be 
living	another	body	or	another	environment.”	
–	Ibid.,	p.	141.	Also	cf.	Karsten	Stueber,	“Em-
pathy”,	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-





the	 term	 refers	 together	 to	 empathy,	 sympa-
thy (Mitfühlung),	or	being	united	with	some-
one. Einfühlung  means  both  feeling-into  and 
feeling-within.	 “It	 is	 how	 you	 find	 yourself	
in	your	own	experiences	–	you	feel	yourself	
within	them.”	–	Marianne	Sawicki,	“Personal	
Connections:	 The	 Phenomenology	 of	 Edith	
Stein”,	 Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical 
Society,	pp.	148–169,	p.	151.
11   
“Wo	die	Vernunft	sich	–	notge	drungen	–	cou-
ragiert,	 die	 Macht	 der	 Natur	 anzuerkennen	
und  dadurch  ihre  eigene  Negation  zu  riskie-
ren:	da	bedarf	es	gerade	des	Künstlers	und	des	
Arztes	als	der	Organe	einer	–	respektablen	–	
Angst	 vor	 dieser	 Courage.”	 –	 O.	Marquard,	
Schwierigkeiten  mit  der  Geschichtsphiloso-
phie, p. 94. Marquard also draws attention to 
the	 fact	 that	many	 books	 on	 the	 philosophy	
of	nature	in	Romanticism	were	written	by	the	
medics	themselves.	Cf.	ibid.,	p.	99.
12	   
Ibid.,	p.	102.
13	   
Ibid.,	p.	98.
14   
Cf.	 Friedrich	 Wilhelm	 Joseph	 Schelling,	
Werke,	 vol.	 7,	Erster  Entwurf  eines  Systems  
der Naturphilosophie,	 Frommann-Holzboog,	
Stuttgart	1976.
15	   
Ibid.,	p.	9.
16	   
“…	 daß	 die	 Wissenschaft	 der	 Medizin	 (...)	
nicht	 nur	 überhaupt	 philosophische	 Bildung	
des	 Geistes,	 sondern	 auch	 Grundsätze	 der	
Philosophie	 voraussetze.”	 –	 Friedrich	 Wil-
helm	Joseph	Schelling,	Werke,	vol.	5,	Fruhe 
Theologische  Und  Philosophische  Arbeiten  
(1793-1795),	Frommann-Holzboog,	Stuttgart	
1976,	pp.	340–341.
17	   
Cf.	 Rastko	 Jovanov,	 “Das	 Leben	 als	 Do-
kument.  Die  Genealogie  des  registrierten  
Lebens	 als	 biopolitische	 Institution”,	 in:	 Jan	
Müller,	 Rastko	 Jovanov,	 Željko	 Radinković	
(eds.),	Politiken des Lebens. Technik, Moral 
und  Recht  als  institutionelle  Gestalten  der  
menschlichen  Lebensform,	 IFDT,	 Belgrade	
2015,	pp.	9–55.
18	   










tended to shared	intentional	states,	i.e.	to	shared emotional or affective states.
It	is	these	shared	emotional	attitudes,	primarily	the	problem	of	empathy	that	
Stein	explores	 in	 the	aforementioned	book.20	Already	in	 the	“Foreword”	of	
the	book,	Stein	announced	that	the	question	of	empathy	will	be	explored	“as	













ality between the content	of	the	intended	act	from	the	object	of	the	intended	
act.	Further,	every	intentional	act	has	temporal dimension,	and	thus	experi-















ception,	 imagination,	 and	 recollection.	 In	 fact,	 the	empathic	 approach	has	occasionally	been	
assumed	to	constitute	the	phenomenological	approach	to	intersubjectivity.”26
For	 explaining	 the	 problem	 of	 self-testimony,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 here	
that	empathy	is	always	directed	at	a	concrete	situation,	which	is	determined	
by earlier	 experiences,	 and	“presuppose	 some	external  point  of  view	 from	
















thoughts	 and	 feelings.	As	Alasdair	 MacIntyre	 properly	 suggests,	 empathy	
should	be	seen	in	the	way	“how	human	beings	comprehend	the	psychic	life	of	















ed Works of Edith Stein,	vol.	3, On the Prob-
lem of Empathy,	translated	by	Waltraut	Stein,	
ICS	Publications,	Washington,	D.	C.	1989.	On	
the	 life	 and	work	 of	 E.	 Stein,	 cf.	 new	 entry	
from	20	March	2020	in	Stanford	Encyclope-
dia:	 Thomas	 Szanto,	 Dermot	Moran,	 “Edith	
Stein”,	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy.	Available	at:	https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2020/entries/stein/  (accessed  on  
22	March	2020).


















24	   
Stein’s	 claim	 that	 empathy	 is	 also	 a	 kind	 of	





Dan	Zahavi,	Subjectivity and Selfhood. Inves-
tigating  the  First-Person  Perspective,	 MIT	
Press,	London	2008,	p.	155.
27	  
Alasdair	MacIntyre,	Edith Stein. A Philosoph-
ical  Prologue,	 Continuum,	 London	 2006,	 p.	
112.
28	  
E.	Stein,	On the Problem of Empathy,	p.	11.
29	  
On	 this	 occasion,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 the	
psychiatrists  and  other  medical  personnel  at  
















tively determines the treatment protocol.30	That	is	where	the	personal,	dyadic	
relationship between the psychiatrist and the patient ends. Everything else is 









within a group. Each new patient is provided with a guide instructing them to 






the	 history	 of	 their	 illness	 and	 its	 social,	 familiar,	 professional	 and	 health	
consequences. The group then decides whether or not the patient should be 
fully	admitted	for	treatment	and	be	treated	as	a	group	member.	The	ultimate	
decision  thus  belongs  to  the  group  itself,	 not	 to	 the	 psychiatrists.	 Patient’s	
self-testimony	will	be	repeated	at	the	very	end	of	the	therapeutic	process,	as	
this	 first	 self-testimony	 is	 expectedly	 presented	 in	 a	 pathological	 state	 and	
its	credibility	is	highly	questioned	due	to	completely	non-objective	views	of	






moral and ethical norms	of	existing	society.	That	is	why	the	therapy	insists	on	














Attending numerous group meetings demonstrated other patients’ genuine de-
sire to help someone who is currently in crisis. The patients in crisis are also 






already	met	 them	and	established	mutual	 empathic	 relationships,	 assessing	
the	patient’s	validity	of	 self-testimony	validity	 is	 facilitated.	Moreover,	 the	
patient	is	much	more	open	to	their	illness’s	narrative	history	and	its	manifes-
tations	than	at	the	first	 self-testimony.	All	this	was	made	possible	by	shared	
empathy within the group and open trust among group members.
At	the	very	end	of	the	therapy	process,	 the	patient	presents	a	rehabilitation	
plan they developed with their associates. The plan covers changes in every 
field:	 from	family	context,	through	professional	rehabilitation	and	health	re-
covery,	to	resocialisation	in	the	broadest	sense.
Thus,	what	 kept	 this	 group	 I	was	 analysing	 together	was	 shared	 empathy,	
through	which	 the	 patient	 reached	 a	 credible	 self-testimony	 and	 richer	 in-










cf.	 Hans	 Sluga,	 “Von	 der	 normativen	 The-
orie	 zur	 diagnostischen	 Praxis”,	 Deutsche 
Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie	 59	 (2011)	 6,	 pp.	
819–834.	 “Medical	 diagnosis	 not	 only	 tries	
to	determine	current	symptoms	of	a	possible	
disease,	but	it	also	tries	to	find	out	the	genesis	
of	 these	 symptoms	 and	 thus	 the	 underlying	
disease. The doctor asks how long the patient 
has	 been	 uncomfortable,	 how	 the	 symptoms	
started,	how	 they	developed,	 etc.	Genealogy	
is  equally  necessary  and appropriate  in  phil-
osophical	diagnosis.	A	dynamic	picture	of	the	
symptoms and the pathology to be determined 





traumatic	 experience	 in	 the	 form	of	 self-tes-
timony,	 cf.	 Janie	A.	Van	Dijk,	Mirjam	 J.	A.	
Schoutrop,	 Philip	 Spinhoven,	 “Testimony	
Therapy.	Treatment	Method	 for	Traumatized	
Victims	 of	 Organized	 Violence”,	 American 
Journal  of  Psychotherapy	 57	 (2003)	 3,	 pp.	
361–373.	 “While	 composing	 the	 testimony,	 
 
the  traumatised  person  is  gradually  exposed  
to  the  traumatic  memories.  The  person  tells  




help  patients  to  better  understand  what  hap-
pened.	(...)	This	effect	might	be	brought	about	





There is still a strong stream in philosophical 
counselling which puts the dyadic over group 
therapy,	 and	 emphasis	 the	 process	 of	 foster-
ing	 virtues,	 wisdom,	 and	 prudence	 within	
philosophical treatment	of	the	client.	Cf.	Arto	
Tukiainen,	 “Philosophical	 Counselling	 as	 a	
Process	of	Fostering	Wisdom	in	the	Form	of	
Virtues”,	 Practical Philosophy. The British 
Journal  of  Philosophical  Practice	10	 (2010)	
1,	 pp.	 47–56.	 The	 concept	 of	 ‘virtues’	 also	
plays	a	significant	role	in	the	work	of	Lydia	B.	
Amir	and	Jess	Flemming.	On	the	other	hand,	




the	patient,	a	person	aware	of	 their	 illness	or	 the	problem	 that	needs	 to	be	
addressed.






within	group	therapy).33 This means that the client always comes to therapy 
with people with whom they have close relationships and who are essential 
to	their	health,	social,	professional	or	family	life.	The	problem	of	therapeutic	
self-testimony	is	not	only	the	epistemological	problem	of	knowledge	as	such.	






Group therapy requires catharsis	seen	in	the	client’s	second	self-testimony,	




their	counselling	can	be	 ineffective	and	 lead	 to	a	greater	degree	of	client’s	
pathology.
It  seems that  it  needs  to  be  particularly  emphasised that  the  normativity of	







son’s	 self-testimony	 is	 not	 a	normative	process	because	 it	 is	 not	 a	process	





to	 augmenting	 the	 naturalistic	 account	 of	 illness.	 Phenomenology	 privileges	 the	 first-person	












But against H. Carel I have argued previously that philosophical practitioners 
should	consider	not	only	phenomenology’s	notion	of	the	first-person singular 
but also first-person plural,	i.e.	a	group	with	its	distinctive	shared	emphatic	
relations	 and	 collective	 attitudes	between	group	members,	 of	which	philo-
sophical	practitioner	is	one	of	them.
After	 successfully	 leaving	clinical	 treatment,	 the	client	 signs	 the	document	
that	they	were	discharged	from	the	treatment	after	(a)	writing down a second 
self-testimony,	(b)	oral	presenting	it	in	front	of	the	group,	and	finally	(c)	after	
the  group accepts  the  testimony.  This  signing of  the  document  can be seen 
as	a	beneficial	 aspect	of	self-testimony	therapy,	as	 the ritualistic closure of  







by treating world beliefs	as	 the	basis	of	phi-
losophical	 counselling,	 for	 example,	 Pierre	
Grimmes,	 Eckart	 Ruschmann	 and,	 most	 in-
fluentially,	 Ran	 Lahav.	 Regarding	 classical	
individual	 therapy,	 cf.	 Gerd	 B.	 Achenbach,	
“On	Wisdom	 in	 Philosophical	 Practice”,	 In-
quiry:  Critical  Thinking  Across  the  Disci-
plines	17	(1998)	3,	pp.	5–20,	doi:	https://doi.
org/10.5840/inquiryctnews199817322;	 Gerd	
B.	 Achenbach,	 Lebenskönnerschaft,	 Verlag	
Herder,	 Freiburg	 2001;	 John	 Kekes,	 “Wis-
dom”,	American  Philosophical  Quarterly	20	
(1983)	3,	pp.	271–286.
33	  
It	 needs	 to	 be	 noted	 that	 some	 traditions	 of	
philosophical  counselling  have  explicitly  
acted	 as	 anti-psychiatric,	 and	 an	 important	




journal	 published	 by	Society	 for	 Philosophy	
in	 Practice	 that	 if	 “philosophical	 therapy	 is	
ever	 to	 claim	 a	 place	 alongside	 other	 forms	
of	 mental	 health	 care	 provision,	 practition-
ers	 must	 adduce	 convincing	 evidence	 of	 its	
therapeutic  merits  and  demonstrate  rigorous  
professional	 safeguards.	 Unfortunately,	 the	
strong  anti-psychiatric  rhetoric  employed  by  
some	 of	 its	 proponents	 is	 unlikely	 to	 garner	
the	 endorsement	 of	 statutory	 regulators	 –	
particularly  when  their  advisory  boards  are  
drawn	from	the	health	sector”.	–	Sam	Brown,	
“The	therapeutic	status	of	philosophical	coun-
selling”,	 Practical Philosophy. The British 





er für Anthropologie und zur Pathologie und 
Therapie  des  Irreseins  (Journal  for  Anthro-
pology, Pathology and Therapy of Insanity),	
for	Irresein has the same root as delusion Ir-
rtum.
35	  









Bavim se problem toga kako su dijeljena empatija i grupna terapija obvezni uvjeti za uspješan 
rad s pacijentima u medicinskoj i klijentima u filozofijskoj praksi. Nadalje, teorija dijeljene 
empatije mora se baviti i nedvojbeno zamršenijim problemom toga kako članovi grupe mogu 
ispravno dijeliti svoju mentalnu domenu s njenom posebnom fenomenologijom, te svoja ose-
bujna držanja jednih prema drugima, tako da nužna samosvjedočanstva klijenata ne počiva-
ju na prethodnom patološkom stanju. U nastavku nudim neke korake prema razrješenju toga 
problema. Učinit ću to ocrtavajući metodologiju koja se nalazi iza teorije dijeljene empatije te 
pokazujući, na primjeru jedne studije slučaja, kako to može biti razumljeno na taj način da se 
prilagođava svim preduvjetima za valjanu koherenciju samosvjedočanstva i uspješnog klijen-
tova liječenja.
Ključne	riječi




Therapie und der philosophischen Praxis – eine Fallstudie
Zusammenfassung
Ich beschäftige mich mit dem Problem, wie geteilte Empathie und Gruppentherapie Pflicht-
voraussetzungen für eine erfolggekrönte Arbeit mit Patienten in der medizinischen und Kunden 
in  der  philosophischen Praxis  sind.  Fernerhin  muss  sich  die  Theorie  der  geteilten  Empathie  
ebenso mit einem zweifellos verwickelteren Problem befassen, nämlich wie Gruppenmitglieder 
die mentale Domäne mit ihrer besonderen Phänomenologie sowie ihre eigenartigen Haltungen 
zueinander richtig teilen und besitzen können, sodass die notwendigen Selbstzeugnisse der Kun-
den nicht auf einem vorausgehenden pathologischen Zustand beruhen. Darauffolgend biete ich 
einige Schritte zur Lösung dieses Problems. Ich tue dies, indem ich die hinter der Theorie der 
geteilten Empathie liegende Methodologie skizziere und am Beispiel einer Fallstudie darlege, 
wie sich dies in einer solchen Weise begreifen lässt, dass es sich an alle Vorbedingungen für eine 








Empathie partagée et témoignage dans la thérapie
psychiatrique et la philosophie pratique – étude d’un cas
Résumé
Je traite du problème de savoir comment l’empathie partagée et la thérapie de groupe sont des 
conditions nécessaires pour un travail réussi avec les patients dans la pratique en médecine, et 
avec les clients dans la pratique philosophique. En outre, la théorie de l’empathie partagée doit 
indubitablement faire face à un problème plus complexe : comment les membres d’un groupe 
peuvent partager et posséder de manière juste le champ mental avec sa phénoménologie parti-
culière qui lui est propre, mais également les attitudes particulières des uns envers les autres ? 
Ainsi, les témoignages nécessaires des clients ne reposent pas sur leur état pathologique an-
térieur. Dans la suite du travail je propose quelques éléments visant à résoudre ce problème. 
Pour cela, je décrirai dans les grandes lignes la méthodologie qui se situe en arrière-fond de la 
théorie de l’empathie partagée en montrant, sur l’exemple d’une étude d’un cas, que cela peut 
être compris de manière à s’adapter à toutes les préconditions afin d’obtenir une cohérence 
valide du témoignage et un traitement efficace pour le client.
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